Coalitional manipulation on networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ju, Biung-Ghi
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 627-662
• 关键词: Allocation problem; Coalitional manipulation; network; Reallocation-proofness; No advantageous reallocation; strategy-proofness; Non-manipulability by merging or splitting

摘要

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a bridge, and corollaries for specialized models dealing with bankruptcy, surplus sharing, cost sharing, income redistribution, social choice with transferable utility, etc. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.