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作者：Picard, Pierre M.; Tabuchi, Takatoshi
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or services) in product (or service) markets where firms compete under monopolistic competition. Workers rent their residential lots in an urban land market and contribute to the production of differentiated goods and inputs. We show that firms and workers co-agglomerate and endogenously form a city....
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：University of Rochester; Boston University
摘要：We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period, and then consume the remainder of it, along with the second pie, at the date at which the second pie becomes available ...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Bonn
摘要：We characterize the incentive compatible, constrained efficient policy (second-best) in a dynamic matching environment, where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents' values. We also derive conditions on the learning process ensuring that the complete-information, dynamically efficient allocation of resources (first-best) is incentive compatible. Our analysis reveals and exploits close, formal relations bet...
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history, as may be the case in online markets. Our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies. We derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) [2,3] for perfect public equilibria and...
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作者：Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study the market implications of ambiguity in common models. We show that generic determinacy is a robust feature in general equilibrium models that allow a distinction between ambiguity and risk. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Muller, Christophe; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We provide a unified treatment of the two approaches pioneered by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982, 1987) [3,4] by resorting to compensation principles in the bivariate case. We treat the attributes of individual utility asymmetrically by assuming that one attribute can be used to compensate another. Our main result consists of two sufficient second-order stochastic dominance conditions. In the case where the compensated variable has a discrete distribution, the distribution of the compensating ...
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作者：Pass, Brendan
作者单位：University of Alberta
摘要：We study the principal agent problem. We show that b-convexity of the space of products, a condition which appears in a recent paper by Figalli, Kim and McCann (2011) [9], is necessary to formulate the problem as a maximization over a convex set. We then show that when the dimension m of the space of types is larger than the dimension n of the space of products, this condition implies that the extra dimensions do not encode independent economic information. When m is smaller than n, we show th...
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can...
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作者：Chari, V. V.; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Yale University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider environments in which agents other than innovator receive the signals about the quality of innovation. We study whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. If such mechanisms are used, the innovator has incentives to manipulate market signals. We show that if an innovator cannot manipulate market signals, then the efficient levels of innovation can be uniquely implemented without deadweight losses for example, b...
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作者：Carlier, G.; Dana, R. -A.; Galichon, A.
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - National Institute for Mathematical Sciences (INSMI)
摘要：This paper studies efficient risk-sharing rules for the concave dominance order. For a univariate risk, it follows from a comonotone dominance principle, due to Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) [27], that efficiency is characterized by a comonotonicity condition. The goal of the paper is to generalize the comonotone dominance principle as well as the equivalence between efficiency and comonotonicity to the multidimensional case. The multivariate case is more involved (in particular because the...
