A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2737-2748
• 关键词: Implementation; Cycle-free graph game; Hierarchical outcome; Average Tree solution; Weighted hierarchical outcome

摘要

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.