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作者：Kruse, Thomas; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems Examples include job search, timing of market entry decisions, irreversible investment or the pricing of American options. This paper analyzes optimal stopping as a mechanism design problem with transfers. We show that under a dynamic single crossing condition a stopping rule can be implemented by a transfer that only depends on the realized stopping decision if and only if it is a cut-off rule. We characterize the transfer implementing...
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作者：Miao, Jianjun; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Boston University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We propose a duality approach to solving contracting models with either one-sided or two-sided limited commitment in continuous time. We establish weak and strong duality theorems and provide a dynamic programming characterization of the dual problem. The dual problem gives a linear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with a known state space subject to free-boundary conditions, making analysis much more tractable than the primal problem. We provide two explicitly solved examples of a consumption...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Leicester
摘要：In a differentiated-product Cournot model, each supplier receives informative signals about demand. The cross-industry correlations of the signals differ: more public signals have higher correlation coefficients. In equilibrium, information is used inefficiently. From the industry's perspective, information is over-used, and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals; from the consumer's perspective, information is under-used, and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private...
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作者：Saito, Kota
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Altruism refers to a willingness to benefit others, even at one's own expense. In contrast, selfishness refers to prioritizing one's own interests with no consideration for others. However, even if an agent is selfish, he might nevertheless act as if he were altruistic out of selfish concerns triggered when his action is observed; that is, he might seek to feel pride in acting altruistically and to avoid the shame of acting selfishly. We call such behavior impurely altruistic. Alternatively, e...
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作者：Cherbonnier, Frederic; Gollier, Christian
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Toulouse (SciencePo Toulouse); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Under which condition does the set of desirable uncertain prospects expand when wealth increases? We show that the decreasing concavity (DC) of the utility function u is necessary and sufficient in the alpha-maxmin expected utility model. in the smooth ambiguity aversion model with the ambiguity valuation function phi, the DC of u and of phi o u is is necessary and sufficient. An alternative classical definition of decreasing aversion is based on the hypothesis that the investment in a risky a...
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作者：Galperti, Simone
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by studying a simpler game in which they can offer only menus of decisions and send cheap-talk signals to the agent. For games in which the principals instead participate in making final decisions, we can ch...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：In a Markov game, players engage in a sequence of games determined by a Markov process. In this setting, this paper investigates the impact of varying the informativeness of public information, as defined by Blackwell [8,9], pertaining to the games that will be played in future periods. In brief, when a curvature condition on payoffs is satisfied, the finding is that, for any fixed discount factor, the set of strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a Markov game with more inf...
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作者：Weng, Xi
作者单位：Peking University
摘要：This paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers, and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule. Buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product. Individual learning generates ex post heterogeneity, which affects the buyers' purchasing decisions, the monopolist's pricing strategy, and efficiency. When learning occurs through good news signals, buye...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Yale University; Northwestern University
摘要：The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 20...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Celik, Levent
作者单位：University of Virginia; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague
摘要：We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized vertical differentiation framework, the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first-best socially optimal line. These upper envelope and first-best optimal line findings extend to symmetric Cournot oligopoly. (C) 2...
