Product line design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Simon P.; Celik, Levent
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.014
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 517-526
• 关键词: Product line design; product differentiation; Second-degree price discrimination; Product line pricing; Cournot multi-product competition

摘要

We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized vertical differentiation framework, the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first-best socially optimal line. These upper envelope and first-best optimal line findings extend to symmetric Cournot oligopoly. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.