Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galperti, Simone
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.018
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 648-667
• 关键词: Common agency; informed principal; Inscrutability Principle; Delegation Principle; Menu; signal

摘要

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by studying a simpler game in which they can offer only menus of decisions and send cheap-talk signals to the agent. For games in which the principals instead participate in making final decisions, we can characterize all their outcomes by studying a simpler game in which principals can again send cheap-talk signals but can offer only menus of direct mechanisms, to which they report their information truthfully. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.