Cournot competition and the social value of information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 466-506
• 关键词: Cournot oligopoly; uncertainty; Bayesian equilibrium; information acquisition; Public and private information

摘要

In a differentiated-product Cournot model, each supplier receives informative signals about demand. The cross-industry correlations of the signals differ: more public signals have higher correlation coefficients. In equilibrium, information is used inefficiently. From the industry's perspective, information is over-used, and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals; from the consumer's perspective, information is under-used, and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals. Welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information (as desired by consumers) but re-balancing that use away from public signals (as desired by the industry). If information is costly and endogenously acquired, then suppliers acquire too much new information, but they use it too little. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.