-
作者：Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the assignment market and the student placement problem as special cases. A mechanism called the minimal RPE mechanism is defined, and two main results are obtained. First, it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain R. Second, it is ...
-
作者：Dekel, Eddie; Friedenberg, Amanda; Siniscalchi, Marciano
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Foundations for iterated admissibility (i.e., the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies) need to confront a fundamental challenge. On the one hand, admissibility requires that a player consider every strategy of their opponents possible. On the other hand, reasoning that the opponents are rational requires ruling out certain strategies. Brandenburger, Friedenberg, Keisler's (BFK, Econometrica, 2008) foundations for iterated admissibility address this challenge with two ingredients: l...
-
作者：Garleanu, Nicolae; Pedersen, Lasse Heje
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Copenhagen Business School; New York University
摘要：We show how portfolio choice can be modeled in continuous time with transitory and persistent transaction costs, multiple assets, multiple signals predicting returns, and general signal dynamics. The objective function is derived from the limit of discrete-time models with endogenous transaction costs due to optimal dealer behavior. We solve the model explicitly and the intuitive solution is also the limit of the solutions of the corresponding discrete-time models. We show how the optimal high...
-
作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; University College London
摘要：Consider a seller with a single indivisible good facing a buyer whose willingness to pay depends on his privately-known taste and on product characteristics privately known by the seller. What selling procedure can arise as an equilibrium of the game in which the seller strategically chooses mechanisms conditional on his information? We characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes and establish that ex-ante revenue maximizing mechanisms are in this set. There is generally a continuum of revenu...
-
作者：Rentschler, Lucas; Turocy, Theodore L.
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure, we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over disjoint intervals of bids, equilibrium supports can have a rich structure, and non-monotonicity of the equili...
-
作者：Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：In financial disputes arising from divorce, inheritance, or the dissolution of a partnership, frequently the need arises to assign ownership of an indivisible item to one member of a group. This paper introduces and analyzes a dynamic auction for simply and efficiently allocating an item when participants are privately informed of their values. In the auction, the price rises continuously. A bidder who drops out of the auction, in return for surrendering his claim to the item, obtains compensa...
-
作者：Sato, Yuki
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：This paper proposes a model of asset-market equilibrium with portfolio delegation and optimal fee contracts. Fund managers and investors strategically interact to determine funds' investment profiles, while they share portfolio risk through fee contracts. In equilibrium, their investment decisions, fee schedules, and stock price feed back into one another. The model predicts that (1) stock market's expected return and volatility increase as more investor capital is intermediated by funds, (2) ...
-
作者：Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro; Lagos, Ricardo; Wright, Randall
摘要：This Symposium on Money and Liquidity follows a conference held in Santa Barbara in August 2014, under the sponsorship of the Laboratory for Aggregate Economics and Finance at UCSB. The conference was a celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Kiyotaki and Wright's On Money as a Medium of Exchange. This Symposium contains a selection of the papers presented at the conference and a selection of regular submissions that fit the theme. All papers were peer-reviewed accord...
-
作者：Lotz, Sebastien; Zhang, Cathy
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We study the choice of payment instruments in a model with money and credit, where sellers must invest in a record-keeping technology to accept credit and buyers have limited commitment. Our model captures the two-sided market interaction between consumers and retailers that can generate multiple equilibria. Limited commitment yields an endogenous debt limit that depends on monetary policy. Money and credit coexist for a range of parameters, and bargaining related hold-up problems can lead to ...
-
作者：Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia
作者单位：Aarhus University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately (narrow bracketing of mental accounts) and sometimes jointly (broad bracketing). We develop a theory of endogenous bracketing, where people set goals to tackle self-control problems. Goals induce reference points that make substandard performance painful. Evaluating goals in a broadly bracketed mental account insulates an individual from exogenous risk of failure; but because decisions or risks in diffe...
