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作者：Devanur, Nikhil R.; Hartline, Jason D.; Yan, Qiqi
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn independently from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson [1] as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distrib...
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作者：Lippi, Francesco; Ragni, Stefania; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Sassari; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study the optimal anticipated policy in a pure-currency economy with flexible prices and a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. The economy features a business cycle and lump-sum monetary injections have distributional effects that depend on the state of the cycle. We parsimoniously characterize the dynamics of the economy and study the optimal regulation of the money supply as a function of the state under commitment. The optimal policy prescribes monetary expansions in recession...
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作者：Matejka, Filip
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：This paper proposes a mechanism leading to rigid pricing as an optimal strategy. It applies a framework of rational inattention to study the pricing strategies of a monopolistic seller facing a consumer with limited information capacity. The consumer needs to process information about the realized price, while the seller is perfectly attentive. The seller chooses to price rigidly, i.e. prices respond to changes in the unit input cost less than if the consumer was perfectly attentive. The rigid...
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作者：Miao, Jianjun; Wang, Pengfei
作者单位：Boston University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper develops a tractable macroeconomic model with a banking sector in which banks face endogenous borrowing constraints. There is no uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Banking bubbles can emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism. Changes in household confidence can cause the bubbles to burst, resulting in a financial crisis. Credit policy can mitigate economic downturns. The welfare gain is larger when the government interventions are more front loaded, given that the gov...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Angus, Simon D.
作者单位：University of Sydney; Monash University
摘要：This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as ...
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作者：Stoye, Joerg
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper takes choice theory to risk or uncertainty. Well-known decision models are axiomatized under the premise that agents can randomize. Under a reversal of order assumption, this convexifies choice sets, and even after imposing the weak axiom of revealed preference and nonemptiness of choice correspondences, the preferences directly revealed by choice may be incomplete or cyclical. Choice correspondence characterizations of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility, (Anscombe-Aumann) s...
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作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：It is shown that a matching market with contracts can be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts. In particular, the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching. As an application of the embedding result, a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where contracts are unilateral substitutes for ...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal-income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents. Strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents. They non-cooperatively coordinate on the equal-income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are Pareto undorninated for them within the set of equal-income competitive allocations. Sincere agents are protected to some extent, however...
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作者：Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, but have different expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. Buyers are of dynamic nature, and arrive and depart over time. Our goal is to design mechanisms that maximize the social welfare. We begin by showing that dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility cannot be used in this case, since any such auction cannot obtain any constant fraction of the optimal social welfa...
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作者：Kellner, Christian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We study a principal agent problem with multiple identical agents, where the action-dependent stochastic relationship between actions and output is perceived to be ambiguous, and agents are ambiguity averse. We argue that ambiguity, and particularly ambiguity aversion, make it more attractive for the principal to choose a tournament. If agents are risk neutral, but ambiguity averse, we show that the set of optimal incentive schemes contains a tournament. Moreover, if ambiguity is rich enough, ...
