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作者：Xu, Zibo
作者单位：Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：This paper presents a collection of convergence results on best-response dynamics in extensive-form games. We prove that in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect information, every solution trajectory to the continuous-time best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium component. We show the robustness of-this convergence in the sense that along any interior approximate best-response trajectory, the evolving state is close to the set of Nash equilibria most of the time. We...
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作者：Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：A seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment, with buyers that differ in their patience: Each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation. First, we derive the optimal mechanism, neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline. The deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer. Depending on the ...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, S.; Maccheroni, F.; Marinacci, M.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We extend the Fundamental Theorem of Finance and the Pricing Rule Representation Theorem to the case in which market frictions are taken into account but the Put Call Parity is still assumed to hold. In turn, we obtain a representation of the pricing rule as a discounted expectation with respect to a nonadditive risk neutral probability. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Evans, Robert; Reiche, Soenje
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract choice, the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place. An outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent t...
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作者：Reffgen, Alexander
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restric...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Huck, Steffen; Oprea, Ryan; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Essex
摘要：We explore the stability of imitation in a 1200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our oligopolies reach highly competitive levels within 50 periods. However, already after 100 periods, quantities start to drop and eventually fall deep into collusive territory without pausing at the Nash equilibri...
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作者：Anderson, Axel
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper considers a dynamic matching model in which each agent's future productivity depends in part on their current match, as in labor markets, schooling, intergenerational marriage markets, and other environments. The Planner's endogenous rankings of human distributions are characterized. These Planner rankings are then used to develop sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching to be dynamically efficient. One lesson that emerges is that complementarity assumptions alone are...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately impl...
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作者：Salomon, Antoine; Forges, Francoise
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player privately knows his own payoffs (private values). Under a further assumption (existence of uniform punishment strategies), the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players. We show that in a class of public...
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作者：Mongin, Philippe; Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Trent University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We introduce a ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as a particular case, when these objects can be given a matrix form. This ranking is separable in terms of rows and columns, and continuous and monotonic in the basic quantities. Owing to the theory of additive separability developed here, we derive very precise numerical representations over a large class of domains (i.e., typically not of the Cartesian product form). We apply these representations to (1) s...
