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作者：Deb, Rahul; Said, Maher
作者单位：University of Toronto; New York University
摘要：We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of their values, and then privately learn the value realizations in period two. Buyers in the second cohort are last-minute shoppers that already know their values upon their arrival in period two. The se...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Rady, Sven; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; University of Bonn; University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider a game of strategic experimentation in which players face identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that equilibrium experimentation ceases at the same threshold belief at which a single agent would stop, even if players can coordinate their...
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作者：Iijima, Ryota
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We offer an equilibrium characterization of a general class of global games with strategic complementarities. The analysis highlights a form of acyclicity in the interim belief structure of global games, which allows us to formalize a selection criterion, iterated generalized half-dominance. This criterion is shown to be a unique global game selection when noise distributions satisfy a regularity condition. A similar logic also applies to the perfect foresight dynamics of Matsui and Matsuyama ...
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作者：Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：We characterize revenue-maximizing mechanisms in Myerson's (1981) environment when the seller behaves sequentially rationally, in the sense that she cannot commit not to propose a new mechanism if the previously chosen one fails to allocate the object. We show that the seller-optimal mechanism takes the same form as in the case when there is commitment: The seller maximizes revenue by assigning, at t = 1, the good to the buyer with the highest virtual valuation if it is above a buyer-specific ...
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作者：Williams, Noah
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：I study the provision of incentives in a continuous time dynamic moral hazard model with hidden actions and hidden states. I consider a principal agent model with linear production and exponential utility, whose explicit solution allows me to show how allocations are distorted for incentive reasons, and how access to hidden savings further alters allocations. I solve the model by applying a stochastic maximum principle, where the co-state variables from the agent's optimization problem become ...
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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Tvede, Mich
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Newcastle University - UK
摘要：In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection demands. We use a few axioms to characterize allocation rules that truthfully implement cost minimizing networks satisfying all connection demands in a game where: (1) a central planner announces an alloca...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; Kleinberg, Robert; Tardos, Eva
作者单位：Cornell University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：This essay introduces the symposium on computer science and economic theory. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder, and all players pay their bids. If players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power, then the first proposer captures the entire surplus. If a full consensus is needed for an offer to be accepted, then the first proposer shares the surplus with at most one other player, and as the period le...
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作者：Deimen, Inga; Ketelaar, Felix; Le Quement, Mark T.
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Akan, Mustafa; Ata, Baris; Dana, James D., Jr.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Chicago; Northeastern University
摘要：Using a mechanism design approach, we consider a firm's optimal pricing policy when consumers are heterogeneous and learn their valuations at different times. We show that by offering a menu of advance-purchase contracts that differ in when, and for how much, the product can be returned, a firm can more easily price discriminate between privately-informed consumers. In particular, we show that screening on when the return option can be exercised increases firm profits, relative to screening on...
