Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Yale University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.018
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 679-701
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; dynamic contracts

摘要

The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.