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作者：Makinen, Taneli; Ohl, Bjorn
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles. Our model predicts that, for a wide range of parameter values, firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief. The equilibrium price system, which features endoge...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Does encouraging trader participation enhance market competitiveness? This paper shows that, when trader preferences are interdependent, trader market power does not necessarily decrease with greater participation, and traders need not become price takers in large markets. Thus, larger markets can be less liquid and associated with lower ex ante welfare. In the linear-normal model, the necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure is provided under which price impact is monot...
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作者：Goller, Daniel; Hewer, Michael
作者单位：University of Agder; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to zero. We show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome, even if only two sellers are present...
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作者：Pinheiro, Roberto; Visschers, Ludo
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Edinburgh; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Workers in less-secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker's marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous, increasin...
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作者：Edhan, Omer
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underlying nonatomic exact market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens [23] value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always a core element, this result provides an axiomatization of the Mertens value as a core-selection. Previous works in this direction assumed the economies to be either differentiable (e.g., Dubey and Neyman [11]) or of uniform finite-type (e.g., Haimanko [16])....
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作者：Masso, Jordi; Nicolo, Antonio; Sen, Arunava; Sharma, Tridib; Uelkue, Levent
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Manchester; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lo...
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作者：Ehling, Paul; Heyerdahl-Larsen, Christian
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate conditions for endogenous incompleteness and completeness in continuous-time financial markets driven by diffusion processes with multiple consumption goods and heterogeneous agents. We show that for a class of utility functions the financial market is endogenously incomplete. A sufficient condition for market completeness is that the dividend diffusion matrix in units of the numeraire good is invertible. Further, financial market completeness can depend on the choice of the num...
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作者：Byford, Martin C.
作者单位：Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT)
摘要：This paper develops a theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium (see Shy, 1996, 2002; Morgan and Shy, 2015). In a general spatial setting, the set of undercut-proof prices is equivalent to the core of a non-transferable utility coalitional-game, played on the set of outcomes that are feasible in Bertrand competition. The result depends critically on two conditions: First, firms must have unlimited capacity and constant marginal costs. Second, the goods produced by firms must on...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Wang, Pengfei
作者单位：New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study a model where some agents have private information about risky asset returns and trade to obtain capital gains, while others acquire the risky asset and hold it to maturity, forming expectations of returns based on market prices. We show that under such a structure, in addition to fully revealing rational expectations equilibria, there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices consistent with rational expectations, where the asset prices are subject to sunspot shocks. Such sunspot shoc...
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作者：Uyanik, Metin
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：The nonemptiness of the alpha-core of games with continuous payoff functions was proved by Scarf (1971) for nontransferable utilities and by Zhao (1999) for transferable utilities. In this paper we present generalizations of their results to games with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. Our handling of discontinuity is based on Reny's (1999) better-reply-security concept. We present examples to show that our generalizations are nonvacuous. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
