The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 132-143
• 关键词: Developmental game theory; laboratory experiment; Steps of dominance; Two-person beauty contest

摘要

We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especially when they observe an equilibrium choice by the rival. Our younger children are the weakest learners mainly because they are less frequently paired with rivals who play at equilibrium. Finally, the choice process data suggests that participants who play at equilibrium in the second trial are also performing fewer steps before reaching a decision, indicating that they are less hesitant about their strategy. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.