An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yin; Dang, Chuangyin
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 659-670
• 关键词: noncooperative game; Nash equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; Quantal response equilibrium; Smooth path

摘要

As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path. (c) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.