Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sperisen, Benjamin; Wiseman, Thomas
• 署名单位: Amazon.com; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 491-511
• 关键词: Matching; dynamic games

摘要

We model stable, non-assortative labor-market matchings. We endogenize how transferable utility is: a matched firm and worker play an infinite-horizon game with one-sided moral hazard. Becker's (1973) result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails, because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives: a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort. Thus, firms may prefer lower-type workers who will exert more effort. We offer a new interpretation of efficiency wages: committing to a high wage improves effort incentives indirectly by increasing the firm's willingness to walk away. We also show that the set of stable outcomes has a lattice structure. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.