A theory of decisive leadership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.013
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 146-168
• 关键词: Political economy; indecisiveness; leadership; ELECTIONS

摘要

We present a theory that rationalizes voters' preferences for decisive leaders. Greater decisiveness entails an inclination to reach decisions more quickly conditional on fixed information. Although speed can be good or bad, agency problems between voters and politicians create preferences among voters for leaders who perceive high costs of delay and have little uncertainty about how to weigh different aspects of the decision problem, and hence who make decisions more rapidly than typical voters. Officials who aspire to higher office therefore signal decisiveness by accelerating decisions. In elections, candidates with reputations for greater decisiveness prevail despite making smaller compromises, and therefore earn larger rents from office holding. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.