On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Masso, Jordi
• 署名单位: Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 219-238
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; anonymity; Tops-onlyness; Single-peakedness

摘要

We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that do main and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.