Vagueness in multidimensional proposals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Qiaoxi
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 307-328
• 关键词: delegation; Vagueness; signaling; Intuitive criterion

摘要

This paper studies how agents choose to be vague in their proposals in a delegation environment. Two agents compete for the approval of a decision maker to implement a multidimensional action. Based on their knowledge of the consequences of actions, agents propose future actions but can be vague about any dimension. The decision maker, uncertain about the consequences of actions, chooses one agent to act. I show that vagueness on the dimension where one stands closer to the decision maker than his opponent preserves such an advantage, while preciseness undermines it. Vagueness therefore tends to occur on agents' advantageous dimensions. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.