Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Xiang; Zeng, Yishu
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; Wuhan University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 288-308
• 关键词: Condition of nowhere equivalence; Large game; Limit admissibility; perfect equilibrium; Proper equilibrium

摘要

This paper studies pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria for games with non-atomic measure spaces of players and infinitely many actions. A richness condition (nowhere equivalence) on the measure space of players is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such equilibria. The limit admissibility of perfect and proper equilibria is also proved. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.