Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele
• 署名单位: University of Turku; University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 108-116
• 关键词: Implementation theory; incomplete information

摘要

We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence, and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability, is also sufficient for the implementation of essentially single-valued social choice sets. The characterization results are then examined in a variety of environments. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.