Bribing the Self

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, Uri; Saccardo, Silvia; Serra-Garcia, Marta; van Veldhuizen, Roel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; Carnegie Mellon University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Lund University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.010
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 311-324
• 关键词: Advice; Self-deception; self-image; Motivated beliefs; laboratory experiment

摘要

Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception helps advisors be biased while preserving their self-image as ethical and identify limits to advisors' ability to self-deceive. In experiments where advisors recommend one of two investments to a client and receive a commission that depends on their recommendation, we vary the timing at which advisors learn about their own incentives. When advisors learn about their incentives before evaluating the available investments, they are more likely to be biased than when they learn about their incentives only after privately evaluating the investments. Consistent with self-deception, learning about the incentive before evaluating the options affects advisors' beliefs and preferences over the investments. Biased advice persists with minimal justifications but is eliminated when all justifications are removed. These findings show how self-deception can be constrained to improve advice provision. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.