Essentially stable matchings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Troyan, Peter; Delacretaz, David; Kloosterman, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 370-390
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; fairness; EFFICIENCY; school choice

摘要

We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object. We show that an essentially stable and Pareto efficient matching always exists and that Kesten's (2010) EADA mechanism always selects one while other common Pareto efficient mechanisms do not. Additionally, we show that there exists a student-pessimal essentially stable matching and that the Rural Hospital Theorem extends to essential stability. Finally, we analyze the incentive properties of essentially stable mechanisms. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.