Consulting collusive experts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Keio University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 290-317
• 关键词: Mechanism design; collusion; DELEGATION; Expert

摘要

In designing a contract with an agent privately informed about its cost, should a principal consult an expert who has already received a partially informative signal of the agent's cost? The expert has a prior relationship with the agent, facilitating (weak) ex ante collusion which coordinates their participation and reporting decisions with accompanying side-payments. While delegating contracting with the agent to the expert is never profitable, we show that consulting the expert is typically valuable. Changes in bargaining power within the coalition have no effect, while altruism of the expert towards the agent makes the principal worse off. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.