Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bao, Renjie; Li, Sanxi; Yu, Jun
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.015
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 105-109
• 关键词: Task assignment; Multitask; principal-agent model; moral hazard

摘要

Balmaceda (2016) shows that, under certain conditions, specialization can dominate multitasking when tasks are complementary, because specialization allows for a more flexible implementation of effort profiles than multitasking does. We show that this result is vacuously true, and multitasking always dominates specialization with task complementarity. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.