Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brutt, Katharina; Schram, Arthur; Sonnemans, Joep
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; European University Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1-31
• 关键词: Endogenous group formation; Diffusion of responsibility; Group decisions; self-selection; social preferences

摘要

We study the effects of varying individual pivotality and endogenous group entry on the selfishness of group decisions. Selfish choices by groups are often linked to the possibility of diffusing responsibility; the moral costs of these decisions appear smaller when individual pivotality is reduced. Our experimental design explores unanimity voting under distinct defaults to identify this effect. In exogenously formed groups we find evidence of responsibility diffusion, but this diminishes with repetition. Our results also demonstrate the role of self-selection in generating differences in group behaviour depending on individual pivotality. Driven by a heterogeneous selection pattern, endogenous group formation amplifies the effects of a change in pivotality. Some people actively seek an environment to diffuse responsibility, while others join groups to promote pro-social behaviour. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.