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作者：Rosa, Benjamin, V
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits. Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licens...
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作者：Gomes, Armando
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We propose a new solution for coalition bargaining problems among n players that can form coalitions c generating heterogenous coalitional values S-c is an element of R. The players' values v(i) and probability of coalition formation mu(c) are given by: V-i = Sigma(C subset of W) (delta V-i + gamma) I (i is an element of C)mu(C) and Sigma(C subset of W) mu(C) = 1, where coalition c is chosen only if it maximizes the average gain gamma(C) = 1/vertical bar C vertical bar (S-C - delta Sigma(j is ...
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作者：Che, Xiaogang; Huang, Yangguang; Zhang, Le
作者单位：University of London; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Macquarie University
摘要：We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy with inefficient supervision. The supervisor may collect an incorrect signal on the agents' effort levels. When reporting to the principal, the supervisor may collude with one or both agents to manipulate the signal in exchange for a bribe. In the hierarchy, we identify a new trade-off between inefficient supervision and supervisor-agent collusion: Due to the incorrect supervisory signal, truthfully reporting the supervisory signal under co...
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作者：Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Boston Mechanism (BM) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) are two competing algorithms in school choice. BM is manipulable whereas DA encourages truth-telling. Recognizing heterogeneous sophistication of students, we use the level-k model to analyze students' strategies under BM in a complete information environment with strict school priorities. Because students tend to manipulate first choice under BM, we characterize the first choice reported by students at all possible sophistication levels. In a...
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作者：Boulatov, Alexei; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of British Columbia; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：The paper characterizes the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism for allocating a good to buyers who face asymmetric budget constraints. The optimal mechanism belongs to one of two classes. When the budget differences between the buyers are small, the mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding. All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences. When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism d...
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作者：Klockmann, Victor; von Schenk, Alicia; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Max Planck Society; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Following Garicano (2000), we consider groups whose members decide what knowledge to acquire and how to use this knowledge in production. If efficient production requires common knowledge, all group members should become workers and acquire common knowledge. But if efficient production requires diverse knowledge, one group member should become manager, acquire rare knowledge, and stand ready to help the other workers. In our laboratory experiment, we find that most groups eventually manage to ...
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作者：Gori, Michele
作者单位：University of Florence
摘要：We propose a general framework to analyse how vulnerable to manipulation social choice functions are when a limited amount of information about individual preferences is available. We focus then on two properties called WMG-strategy-proofness and group WMG-strategy-proofness. A social choice function is [group] WMG-strategy-proof if it cannot be manipulated by an individual [a coalition of individuals] whose information about the preferences of the others is limited to the knowledge, for every...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Tabarrok, Alex; Zubrickas, Robertas
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; George Mason University; George Mason University; University of Bath
摘要：The assurance contract mechanism is often used to crowdfund public goods. This mechanism has weak implementation properties that can lead to miscoordination and failure to produce socially valuable projects. To encourage early contributions, we extend the assurance contract mechanism with refund bonuses rewarded only to early contributors in the event of fundraising failure. The experimental results show that our proposed solution is very effective in inducing early cooperation and increasing ...
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作者：Saraiva, Gustavo
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：This paper builds on Kojima and Pathak (2009)'s result of vanishing manipulability in large stable mechanisms. We show that convergence toward truth-telling in stable mechanisms can be achieved much faster if colleges' preferences are independently drawn from an uniform distribution. Another novelty from our results is that they can be applied to competitive environments in which virtually all vacancies end up being filled. So this paper adds evidence to the fact that, though stable matching m...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; Piaser, Gwenael
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IPAG Business School
摘要：In competing-mechanism games under exclusivity, principals simultaneously post mechanisms, and agents then simultaneously participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, we develop two complete-information examples that question the folk theorems established in the literature. In the first example, there exist equilibria in which some principal obtains less than her min-max payoff, computed over all players' actions. Thus folk theorems must involve bounds on principals...
