Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gori, Michele
• 署名单位: University of Florence
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 350-369
• 关键词: Social choice function; manipulability; strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; anonymity; Pareto optimality

摘要

We propose a general framework to analyse how vulnerable to manipulation social choice functions are when a limited amount of information about individual preferences is available. We focus then on two properties called WMG-strategy-proofness and group WMG-strategy-proofness. A social choice function is [group] WMG-strategy-proof if it cannot be manipulated by an individual [a coalition of individuals] whose information about the preferences of the others is limited to the knowledge, for every pair of alternatives, of the number of people preferring the first alternative to the second one. We prove that there are Pareto optimal, WMG-strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice functions, that every Pareto optimal and WMG-strategy-proof social choice function is not anonymous if the alternatives are at least three, and that every Pareto optimal and group WMG-strategy-proof social choice function is dictatorial if the alternatives are three. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.