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作者：Bhattacharjee, Swagata
作者单位：Ashoka University
摘要：Outsourcing of research is commonly observed in knowledge-intensive industries such as biotech. We model innovation as an ambiguous stochastic process with dynamically consistent updating. We assume that the research labs are less ambiguity averse than the commercial firms. We characterize the optimal sequence of short-term contracts governing innovation, and show how it facilitates ambiguity-sharing. This ambiguity sharing agreement mitigates the dynamic moral hazard problem, resulting in mon...
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作者：Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, Luca Paolo
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Antwerp
摘要：We introduce weighted links in a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. We find that the equilibrium predictions are sharper than when links are not weighted. In particular, active players form a complete core-periphery graph, where they are either in the core of interconnected players, or connected to every player in the core. Furthermore, a player's type is tightly related to her public good provision and her position in the network. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：We compare the profit of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave profit functions (in the price space) and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This profit bound holds for any number of segments and pr...
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作者：Bilo, Vittorio; Caragiannis, Ioannis; Flammini, Michele; Igarashi, Ayumi; Monaco, Gianpiero; Peters, Dominik; Vinci, Cosimo; Zwicker, William S.
作者单位：University of Salento; Aarhus University; Gran Sasso Science Institute (GSSI); Research Organization of Information & Systems (ROIS); National Institute of Informatics (NII) - Japan; University of L'Aquila; University of Toronto; Union College
摘要：We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility functions are monotonic over bundles, we show the existence of EF1 allocations for at most four agents, and the existence of EF2 allocations for any number of agents; our proofs involve discrete analogues of the Stromquist's moving-knife protocol and the Su-S...
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作者：Erkut, Hande
摘要：Experimental research on generosity has focused predominantly on behavior in the monetary domain, although many real-life decisions occur in the non-monetary domain. Investigating generosity preferences in the non-monetary domain is important for understanding a large class of situations ranging from effort provision at work to reducing individual CO2 emissions. This paper shows generosity differs between the monetary and non-monetary domains and that different social norms of allocation can p...
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作者：Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Guinazu, Nadia; Juarez, Noelia; Neme, Pablo; Oviedo, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：In a many-to-one matching model, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings when firms' choice functions satisfy substitutability. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sohn, Jin-yeong; Wu, Wenhao
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; ShanghaiTech University
摘要：We introduce the uncertainty of psychological motivation into a reciprocity model and explore its implications on behavior. More precisely, we assume that reciprocity sensitivities are subject to incomplete information and extend the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium in extensive-form games (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) to a broader class of incomplete information games. We use this general framework to study many well-known games and find that uncertainty could either mitigate or stren...
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作者：Barthel, Anne -Christine; Hoffmann, Eric; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; West Texas A&M University; University of Kansas
摘要：In game theory, p-dominance and its set-valued generalizations serve as important robust solution concepts. We show that in monotone games, (which include the broad classes of supermodular games, submodular games, and their combinations) these concepts can be characterized in terms of pure strategy Nash equilibria in an auxiliary game of complete information. The auxiliary game is constructed in a transparent manner that is easy to follow and retains a natural connection to the original game. ...
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作者：Rao, Neel
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：This article studies a wage posting game in which workers invest in human capital so as to reduce the disutility of labor. If investment were observable, then no workers would invest in skills due to the holdup problem, and all employers would offer the monopsony wage as in the Diamond paradox. With unobservable investment, however, the equilibrium wage and skill distributions are nondegenerate, despite agents being ex ante identical. An asymptotic efficiency result is obtained in which invest...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Miami; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Markets differ in the availability of past trading records of their participants. In a repeated sale model with adverse selection, we study the impact of the availability of such records on trading outcomes. We consider regimes varying with respect to the length of the available records. We characterize a class of equilibria in which the record length has direct welfare implications via the market's need to re-screen the seller, as well as indirect implications via the low quality seller's inc...
