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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Shinshu University; Hosei University; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：We examine the roles of (slightly weakened versions of) the observable substitutability condition and the observable substitutability across doctors condition of Hatfield et al. (2021) in many-to-many matching with contracts. We modify the standard cumulative offer algorithm to find stable outcomes and prove new results on the existence of stable outcomes. It is remarkable that size monotonicity at the offer-proposing side is essential for the existence result under observable substitutability...
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作者：Nikzad, Afshin
摘要：The signals used in persuasion mechanisms in practice typically satisfy two well-studied simple properties: (i) they partition an ordered state space into intervals, and (ii) they do not recommend lower actions at higher states. These properties have been studied-often separately-in the Bayesian persuasion literature, where conditions for the optimality of such signals are provided in various settings. The two properties can be defined only when the action and the state space are ordered. Unde...
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作者：Wang, Wenbin; Hu, Shanshan
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies the optimal contract for a risk-neutral agency with limited liability. We introduce a novel formulation of the model, in which the contract design problem reduces to a problem of constructing the distribution function of a random variable. This formulation directly balances the principal's tradeoff between incentivizing the agent to exert proper effort and minimizing the cost of the agent's compensation. We show that the optimal contract may involve one or two tiers of perfo...
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作者：Venel, Xavier
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We analyze a class of stochastic games where two lobbies compete by influencing the opinions in a society. We assume that the opinions evolve according to De Groot opinion formation and that the decisions of the lobbies change the structure of the network representing the society. We show that the regularity of discounted Nash equilibrium payoffs when players become patient is highly model-dependent. We provide two extreme cases. First, we present an example where the sequence of discounted Na...
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作者：Leshno, Jacob D.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Inria; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study the dynamics of price discovery in decentralized two-sided markets. We show that there exist memoryless dynamics that converge to the core of the underlying assignment game in which agents' actions depend only on their current payoff. However, we show that for any such dynamic the convergence time can grow exponentially in relation to the population size. We present a natural dynamic in which a player's reservation value provides a summary of his past information and show that this dy...
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作者：Nunnari, Salvatore
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：In many domains, committees bargain over a sequence of policies and a policy remains in effect until a new agreement is reached. In this paper, I argue that, in order to assess the consequences of veto power, it is important to take into account this dynamic aspect. I analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that full appropriation by the veto player is the only stable policy when legislators are sufficiently impatient; and that, irresp...
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作者：Etessami, Kousha
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for finite n-player extensive form games of perfect recall (EFGPR), n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements, including sequential equilibrium, extensive-form perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium. Informally, we show that, for all these refinements, approximating such a refined equilibrium for an n-player EFGPR is not any harder than (i.e., can be efficiently reduced to)...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form games. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to identify a structural property of 2-player games, called the block partition property, which helps characterize the strategy profiles that are indirectly dominated by a fixed profile. Our analysis also generalizes and unifies existing results on ...
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作者：Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw
作者单位：Friedrich Schiller University of Jena; University of Mannheim
摘要：We use an experiment to compare a theory of risk-aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay auction. Both risk and spite are used to rationalize deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids. We exploit that equilibrium predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spite are different than those for risk-aversion. We find that spite is a convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-...
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作者：Shahdadi, Behrang Kamali
摘要：The effect of sorting students based on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer effects but also on indirect peer effects through teachers' efforts. Standard assumptions in the literature are insufficient to determine the effect of sorting on the performances of students and so are silent on the effect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs. We show that the effect of such policies depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utilit...
