Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boulatov, Alexei; Severinov, Sergei
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of British Columbia; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.001
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 155-178
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Optimal and efficient mechanisms; auctions; Asymmetric budget constraints

摘要

The paper characterizes the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism for allocating a good to buyers who face asymmetric budget constraints. The optimal mechanism belongs to one of two classes. When the budget differences between the buyers are small, the mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding. All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences. When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism discriminates in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high. We also provide a characterization of the constrained-efficient (surplus maximizing) mechanism and demonstrate that it shares the above properties of the optimal mechanism.& nbsp; Crown Copyright (C)& nbsp;2021 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.