Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; Piaser, Gwenael
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IPAG Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 79-93
• 关键词: Competing mechanisms; Folk theorems; Exclusive competition

摘要

In competing-mechanism games under exclusivity, principals simultaneously post mechanisms, and agents then simultaneously participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, we develop two complete-information examples that question the folk theorems established in the literature. In the first example, there exist equilibria in which some principal obtains less than her min-max payoff, computed over all players' actions. Thus folk theorems must involve bounds on principals' payoffs that depend on the messages available to the agents, and not only on the players' actions. The second example shows that even this nonintrinsic approach is misleading: there exist incentive-feasible allocations in which principals obtain more than their min-max payoffs, computed over arbitrary spaces of mechanisms, but which cannot be supported in equilibrium. Key to these results is the standard requirement that agents' participation and communication decisions are tied together. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.