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作者：Collins, Sean M.; James, Duncan; Servatka, Maros; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：Fordham University; Fordham University; Macquarie University; University of Economics Bratislava; Carleton University
摘要：We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and non-stationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshal...
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作者：Beggs, Alan
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies games when agents have second-order expected utility. It examines the theoretical predictions of the model and compares its performance in explaining behavior in experimental data on games with that of quantal response equilibrium. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Avataneo, Michelle; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Northwestern University; Iowa State University
摘要：In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT). These rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechani...
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作者：Gordon, Sidartha; Marlats, Chantal; Menager, Lucie
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：This paper studies the dynamics of effort provision in teams when there are exogenous observation delays between partners. Agents are engaged in a common project whose duration is uncertain and yields no benefit until one of them has completed it. All it takes to complete the project is one success, which can be obtained after the investment of costly effort. An agent learns immediately when he succeeds but learns whether his partners succeeded after some delay. In equilibrium, players alterna...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We prove that the Maskin monotonicity* condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in ...
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作者：Vida, Peter; Honryo, Takakazu
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite Bourgogne Europe; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Doshisha University
摘要：The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria? To select a unique equilibrium, this notion is usually coupled with the intuitive criterion. The simultaneous usage of these concepts is ad hoc, unjustified, and again might...
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作者：Dogan, Serhat; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We present a characterization of the Luce rule in terms of positivity and a new choice axiom called odds supermodularity that strengthens the regularity axiom. This new characterization illuminates a connection that goes unnoticed, and sheds light on the behavioral underpinnings of the Luce rule and its extensions from a different perspective. We show that odds supermodularity per se characterizes a structured extension of the Luce rule that accommodates zero probability choices. We identify t...
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作者：Name Correa, Alvaro J.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
摘要：An uninformed principal appoints a committee of experts to vote on a multi-attribute alternative, such as an interdisciplinary project. Each expert evaluates one attribute and is biased toward it (specialty bias). The principal values all attributes equally but has a status quo bias, reflecting the organizational cost of a change. We study whether the principal would compose the committee of more or less specialty-biased experts. We show that her optimal composition is nonmonotonic in the majo...
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作者：Ahmad, Ghufran
作者单位：National University of Sciences & Technology - Pakistan
摘要：I consider the housing market problem with weak preferences. In this context, I provide a sufficient condition for weak group strategy proofness; no group of agents can jointly misreport their preferences such that each agent in the group becomes better-off. Using this sufficient condition, I prove that the top trading absorbing sets, top cycles, and highest priority objectrules satisfy weak group strategy proofness. Thus, this paper establishes that it is possible to achieve weak group strate...
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作者：Puppe, Clemens; Rollmann, Jana
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We experimentally compare two natural mechanisms for the collective choice of an allocation of a fixed budget to a number of divisible public projects: the mean rule that implements the average of all individual proposals, and a suitably normalized median rule. Theoretical results predict extreme voting behavior in equilibrium under the mean rule and frequently sincere voting under the normalized median rule. Our findings confirm equilibrium behavior under the mean rule in situations in which ...
