An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saraiva, Gustavo
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 55-77
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; large markets

摘要

This paper builds on Kojima and Pathak (2009)'s result of vanishing manipulability in large stable mechanisms. We show that convergence toward truth-telling in stable mechanisms can be achieved much faster if colleges' preferences are independently drawn from an uniform distribution. Another novelty from our results is that they can be applied to competitive environments in which virtually all vacancies end up being filled. So this paper adds evidence to the fact that, though stable matching mechanisms are not entirely strategy-proof, in practice, when the number of participants in the market is sufficiently large, they can be treated as being effectively strategy-proof. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.