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作者：Koch, Simon; Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：University of Kaiserslautern
摘要：The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are also effective with socially attentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain the puzzle why empirically only a fraction of employees experiences monetary incentives. Furthermore, in case the agent's type is private information, the principal optimally offers a single pooling cont...
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作者：Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Durham University; Deakin University; Boston College
摘要：Economists have long recognized that the effect of move order on outcomes is non-negligible in sequential contests. We study tiebreak mechanisms used in team sports and known as penalty shootouts through a dynamic model. We characterize all order-independent mechanisms where two balanced teams have equal chances to win the shootout whenever they are tied after equal numbers of attempts; thus, move order has no relevance for winning chances. In most sports, such as football and hockey, teams ta...
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作者：Shi, Fanqi
作者单位：Peking University
摘要：I study a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Investment increases each agent's matching surplus in the second period, by a magnitude of the worker's investment ability in the match pair. Assuming each worker's investment ability is her private information that unfolds in the second period, I define a notion of sequential stability, and show that the set of sequentially stable outcomes is a super...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Koczy, Laszlo A.
作者单位：Maastricht University; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Budapest University of Technology & Economics
摘要：In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty generalizations. Among these, the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set are defined by a similar set of conditions. We identify some problems with the payoff-equivalence minimal ...
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作者：Meng, Delong
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We propose a social learning model where agents choose who to communicate with based on the trade-off between collecting information and influencing others' actions. Like-minded people reveal more truthful information, but talking to someone different makes an agent more likely to influence another person's action, because like-minded people will take similar actions anyway. In our model agents start with heterogeneous priors about an unknown state of the world. First agents form coalitions of...
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作者：Karos, Dominik; Robles, Laura
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：An abstract game consists of a set of states, preferences over states, and an effectivity correspondence specifying what coalitions are allowed to replace one state by another one. Agents are called farsighted if, when deciding whether to support a coalition's move, they compare the status quo to the long term outcome following their deviation. Yet, this definition of farsightedness ignores a coalition's option to remain at the status quo allowing another coalition to move: agents are not full...
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作者：Blumrosen, Liad; Dobzinski, Shahar
摘要：We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We design simple and robust mechanisms that obtain approximate efficiency with these properties. We show that even minimal use of statistical data can yield good approximation results. We then demonstrate how a mechanism for this simple bilateral-trade problem ...
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作者：Beccuti, Juan; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of Bern
摘要：This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment, by allowing for contracts that determine the good's allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period. We show that the revenue-maximizing menu of contracts features screening by mode of trade when future trade is subject to frictions and the monopolist is more patient than consumers. Selling to high types while renting to low ty...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Barter and commodity markets have been ubiquitous throughout history, suggesting that humans are good at exploiting profitable exchange opportunities. This paper studies our ability to trade through a developmental approach. We present a market experiment involving children who have not yet fully developed trading habits and are relatively unfamiliar with the concept of money. Namely, we ask 117 children aged 5 to 8 to trade in situations in which efficient market outcomes can either be achiev...
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作者：Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Syropoulos, Constantinos
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Drexel University
摘要：On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree ...
