Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-28
• 关键词: mechanisms; Interdependent types; ex post incentive compatibility; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Preference functions; Jury decisions; Allocation problems

摘要

We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.