The bargaining trap

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.006
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 249-254
• 关键词: alternating offers; bargaining; time preferences; Haggling costs; Outside options

摘要

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a trap, where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein's example of fxed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with costless unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.