Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ackfeld, Viola; Gueth, Werner
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1-32
• 关键词: Personal information disclosure; incentives; Social pressure; privacy; experiment

摘要

Personal information is shared extensively every day, particularly when competing for others' attention on online platforms. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the interaction of peer comparison and incentives as drivers to disclose potentially privacysensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report feeling more compelled to reveal information. Our results shed light on additional drivers for the current information-sharing trend, while pointing to neglected social pressure to disclose personal information in competitive environments. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.