Markovian persuasion with two states*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Hernandez, Penelope; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.001
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 292-314
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; information design; Markov games; Repeated games with incomplete; INFORMATION

摘要

This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent ' s belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with a finite number of actions. We characterize the sender ' s optimal message strategy in the limit, as the length of each period decreases to zero. We show that the limit optimal strategy is myopic for beliefs smaller than the invariant distribution of the underlying Markov process. For beliefs larger than the invariant distribution, the optimal policy is more elaborate and involves both silence and splitting of the receiver ' s beliefs; it is not myopic. Crown Copyright (c) 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).