Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Louis, Philippos; Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.003
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 116-151
• 关键词: Trimmed mean; equilibrium; experiment; Collective decisions; social welfare; Utilitarianism; Minmax

摘要

Eliminating - or trimming - extreme reports before aggregating them is usually motivated by the perception that it constitutes a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting when using trimmed-mean mechanisms for preference aggregation. Contrary to the above presumption, we show, both formally and experimentally that, under such mechanisms, voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming. Furthermore, we show that while trimming promotes efficiency (i.e. the average payoff increases), it also leads to more inequality (i.e. the minimum payoff decreases). While experimental results provide some support for the idea that trimming can mitigate strategic misreporting, the extent of this non-equilibrium behavior is not enough to neutralize trimming's predicted effect on efficiency and inequality.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.