Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ma, Siyu; Biran, Dov
• 署名单位: Beijing Jiaotong University; China University of Political Science & Law
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.006
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 472-483
• 关键词: Nuclear deterrence; Intelligence system; perfect Bayesian equilibrium

摘要

This note stems from Jelnov et al. (2017), which analyzed the interaction of two enemy nations- Player 1 (the weak nation) and Player 2 (the strong nation). 1 (he) wishes to develop a nuclear bomb, and 2 (she) who employs a noisy intelligence system, IS, aims to deter him. Based on the signal sent by IS, 2 decides whether to attack 1. If the precision (a) of IS is commonly known, not only 2 is strictly better off with a better quality (higher precision) IS but also is 1. In contrast, this note shows that if ais 2's private information, 1 is not necessarily better off from a more accurate IS, and 2 is only weakly better off. Moreover, the equilibrium outcome depends on 1's estimate of IS's precision (E(alpha)). A greater estimated precision leads to less aggressive behaviors of both players, thereby reducing the chance of a conflict. (C) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.