Fairly taking turns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mackenzie, Andrew; Komornik, Vilmos
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 743-764
• 关键词: fair division; intertemporal choice

摘要

We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy -free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).