Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Altuntas, Acelya; Phan, William; Tamura, Yuki
• 署名单位: Deakin University; North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 156-181
• 关键词: Behavioral market design; Endowment manipulation; Heuristic manipulation; strategy-proofness; Object exchange; Generalized Top Trading Cycles

摘要

Consider object exchange problems when each agent may be endowed with and consume more than one object. For most domains of preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. Insisting on the first two properties, we explore the extent to which weaker incentive compatibility can be achieved. Motivated by behavioral and computational considerations as well as online mechanisms, we define several forms of manipulation. We consider the lexicographic domain of preferences, and provide several characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles based on properties concerning immunity from heuristic and identity-splitting manipulations. We also show that this establishes a boundary with respect to incentive compatibility-minimal strength-ening results in impossibility. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.