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作者：Harris, Adam; Mccallum, Scott; Harre, Michael S.
作者单位：University of New England; Macquarie University; University of Sydney
摘要：We report on the topological structure of logit quantal response equilibria for asymmetric, two-player, two-choice games in normal form, via catastrophe theory. We present three main outcomes: first, a novel, smooth potential function for the underlying dynamics, relative to which logit equilibria arise as stationary points comprising a parameterised hyper-surface; secondly, a proof that all catastrophes within this manifold are of order at most three, i.e. folds and cusps; thirdly, discovery ...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Tsukuba
摘要：By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games with i.i.d. randomly drawn payoffs in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993a) exists, long-run outcomes under behavioral rules are characterized by social choice rules.
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作者：Salamat, Ramtin
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When consumers differ in both their valuations and their likelihood of being well-matched with the product, the seller can benefit from offering trial plans as persuasion instruments to the extent of full surplus extraction. In the presence of picky consumers, those skeptical about product quality but willing to pay a premium if the product meets their standards, offering a menu of trials allows the seller to screen consumers and extract more surplus. If consumers with a higher valuation for a...
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作者：Piazolo, David; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders are 'more expensive' under unanimity rule because they like to be perceived as high types. Ineffic...
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作者：Kandel, Emanuel; Mugerman, Yevgeny; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We investigate subjects' decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose w...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：Georgetown University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an identified model rapidly tends to zero. We propose a novel sufficient condition ensuring identification, which is strictly weaker than some of those existing in the literature. While this sufficient condition reaches our upper bound, an example demonstrates...
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作者：Zhao, Shuchen
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Using a series of laboratory experiments, this paper examines whether preferences for positively skewed assets, commonly observed in individual decision-making, persist in market settings where assets with both positive and negative skewness coexist. Results from a traditional BDM (Becker et al., 1964) task confirm a strong preference for positively skewed assets. However, this preference does not carry over to continuous double auction (CDA) markets with balanced endowments: market prices equ...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Liu, Zhenxun
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Jinan University
摘要：Digital platforms may manipulate customer reviews to impede other consumers from acquiring accurate information and to increase sales. In a rational inattention setting where consumers acquire information about product quality before making purchasing decisions, we show that the platform has incentives to restrict information acquisition in the presence of consumers with wishful thinking. These biased consumers are unaware of their bias and weigh any good news about the product quality more he...
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作者：Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：This paper examines the evolution of strategies in repeated 2 x 2 anti-coordination games. Turn-taking is advantageous against strategies that consistently choose the same stage-game action, provided the discount factor is sufficiently high or the payoff asymmetry in coordination is sufficiently low. However, it becomes vulnerable when the set of strategies allowed to invade is expanded. Nonetheless, if the matching process exhibits a high degree of assortativity, turn-taking regains robustnes...
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作者：Gao, Lei; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zhewei
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats-stronglead, weak-lead, and simultaneous-can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead con...
