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作者：Zerbini, Antoine
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policymaking. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying ...
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作者：Bland, James R.; Turocy, Theodore L.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Toledo; University of East Anglia; Alan Turing Institute
摘要：One of the original objectives of the (logit) quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) model was to provide a method for structural estimation of behavior in games, when behavior deviated from Nash equilibrium predictions. To date, only Chapter 6 of the book on quantal response equilibrium by Goeree et al. (2016) focuses on how such estimation can be implemented. We build on that chapter to provide here a more detailed treatment of the methodological issues of implementing maximum likelihood estima...
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作者：Teeselink, Bouke Klein; Van Dolder, Dennie; Van Den Assem, Martijn J.; Dana, Jason D.
作者单位：University of London; King's College London; University of Essex; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Yale University
摘要：We examine high-stakes strategic choice using more than 40 years of data from the American TV game show The Price Is Right. In every episode, contestants play the Showcase Showdown, a sequential game of perfect information for which the optimal strategy can be found through backward induction. We find that contestants systematically deviate from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These departures from optimality are well explained by a modified agent quantal response model that allows for l...
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作者：Benndorf, Volker; Kubler, Dorothea; Normann, Hans-Theo
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we ...
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作者：Maxey, Tyler
作者单位：Princeton University
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作者：Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce social goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results s...
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Lausanne; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May's Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and neutrality are incompatible for many problem instances and we explore this tradeoff for strategy-proof rules. The notion of SP that we em...
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作者：Chen, Haoning; Dong, Miaomiao; Henry, Marc; Sidorov, Ivan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minorit...
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作者：van Damme, Eric; Lang, Xu
作者单位：Tilburg University; Shandong University
摘要：We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, ...
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作者：Hamdan, Adam
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：A principal wants to rank and reward teams in an organization. Agents perfectly observe the local ranking of their teams, and strictly prefer being on higher-ranking teams. I show there exists an ex-post incentive compatible and efficient team ranking mechanism if (i) there is an agent who belongs to every team (supervisor condition), or (ii) whenever two teams share an agent in common, they share at least two agents in common (connectivity condition). I identify a class of organizations for w...
