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作者：Liu, Shuige; Maccheroni, Fabio
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called Delta p-rationalizability, which includes action distribu...
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作者：Erkut, Hande; Kubler, Dorothea
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The ma...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they...
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作者：Heufer, Jan; Shachat, Jason; Xu, Yan
作者单位：Durham University; University of Groningen
摘要：We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealt...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei
作者单位：Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness.In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result,...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
摘要：The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk-dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that pl...
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作者：Liu, Dongri; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper, we provide an implementation of the optimal mechanism of Es & ouml; and Szentes (2007) for their general environment without assuming constant marginal utility (in the first-stage type) for the buyers. Our implementation is carried out through a three-stage handicap auction. In stage 1, each buyer, knowing his first-stage type, is required to select a handicap menu by paying a menu fee. A higher menu fee would lead to a more favorable handicap menu, which charges a lower handica...
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作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：We study the effect of the option to exit in finite-horizon, two-person bargaining where players make offers alternatingly and incur fixed costs per period. We show that players use take-it-or- leave-it strategies in the unique equilibrium when there is no discounting. Expecting a low payoff at the next period as a respondent, a proposer would choose to exit after her demand were rejected. This causes her opponent to accept her take-it-or-leave-it offer. This prediction is generically valid ev...
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作者：Saran, Rene
作者单位：University of Cincinnati; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We present a novel and tractable method that is widely applicable to general delegation problems. Every delegation set is equivalent to an incentive feasible mechanism. We characterize mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity and prove that the corresponding constrained problem is equivalent to a discrete-time, finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. This transformation makes the problem tractable: The dynamic problem is essentially a shortest-path problem that is am...
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作者：Fan, Zhongjie; He, Ping; Liu, Zehao
作者单位：University of International Business & Economics; Tsinghua University; Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China
摘要：We examine safety premiums through the lens of financial contagion in interbank networks. In our model with endogenous collateralized lending contracts, safe assets command premiums because they relax funding constraints without amplifying default propagation. Multiple equilibria characterized by distinct lending volumes and safety premiums emerge exclusively in networks containing directed cycles. The safety premium thus serves as a tractable, price-based statistic of systemic fragility. Comp...
