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作者：Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Huck, Steffen; Humphreys, Macartan
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Trinity College Dublin; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by bandwagoning with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose ...
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作者：Fischer, Sabine; Grosch, Kerstin
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：This study examines the effect of agents' overconfident expectations in their production on their contract breach. Drawing on a reference-dependent framework, we theoretically deduce propositions for compliance to agreements where an agent exhibits overconfidence and loss aversion. We further conduct a lab experiment with a multiple-stage design and find that overconfident agents are more likely to breach the contract than non-overconfident agents. Moreover, overconfident agents breach more of...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Karos, Dominik; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bielefeld; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on a fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with the action has been chosen in the past. We analyze optimal strategies associated with three types evaluations of infinite payoffs: discounted present value, the limit inferior, and the limit superior of the partial averages. We show that when the first two are the evaluation schemes (and discount factor is su...
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作者：Igarashi, Ayumi; Meunier, Frederic
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees
摘要：We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible good and chores under category constraints. There are agents and items, partitioned into categories with capacity limits, and an allocation is feasible ilevary bundle respects thus limits ontwe agents, Shoshan et al. (2023) gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying EF[1, 1], a relaxed form of envy-freeness. Extending this beyond two agents was open. We show that for any number of agents and any numb...
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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent more optimistic than the low type. Learning is modeled as a series of experiments, where the agent privately chooses his effort in each experiment. Due to the joint presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, even the low type can misrepresent his type, shirk during experim...
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作者：Friedman, Evan; Goncalves, Duarte
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, a...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maxim...
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作者：Szwagrzak, Karol Flores-; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：A partnership can yield a return-a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different...
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作者：Berliant, Marcus; Gouveia, Miguel
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：The political economy setting of voting over general nonlinear income taxes with labor disincentives and information asymmetry in consumer/worker/voter types is considered. Agents do not communicate or coordinate with each other. The economy is the realization of a finite draw from a continuous distribution. The revenue required from a draw is determined by Pareto optimal provision of a public good for that draw. Assuming that the government must meet the revenue requirement for any possible d...
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作者：Innocenti, Federico
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that competition among senders benefits receivers if and only if the information environment is Blackwell-connected. This paper shows that introducing receivers' limited attention and heterogeneous beliefs can overturn this result. Even in a Blackwell-connected information environment, information revelation may be lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed, limited attention may incentivize receivers to sort into the audiences of like-minded senders. In ...
