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作者：Roel, Marcus; Chen, Zhuoqiong
作者单位：University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines behavioral differences in sequential games that arise when choices are elicited via the direct-response method, where players observe the choices made by those who acted earlier and respond with a single choice, or strategy method, where they make their choice(s) in response to all possible choices by those who acted before regardless of whether such actions were taken. We conducted a 2 x 2 between-subject large-scale online experiment with over 8000 participants on Amazon ...
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作者：Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
摘要：Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general 'maxmin' class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.
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作者：Hermida-Rivera, Hector
作者单位：Budapest University of Technology & Economics
摘要：In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player, and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rule...
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作者：Luo, Zhaotian; Rozenas, Arturas
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how the speaker acquires information when they can misrepresent it in communication with the audience. In a binary action setup, we characterize the speaker's optimal information design and the parametric conditions under which the acquired information is disclosed truthfully. When the players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the speaker uses the same information structure as when they could not lie, and they communicate that information truthfully. By contrast, when the play...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoder, Nathan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability,...
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作者：Morita, Kimiyuki; Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Osaka; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School
摘要：We study a moral hazard model where multiple agents exhibit interpersonal projection bias, perceiving their peers' production states as similar to their own. Each agent's production state is private information. We characterize optimal contracts with limited liability that induce effort from agents in a production state better than a given cutoff. When the cutoff is sufficiently low (high), relative (resp. joint) performance evaluation is optimal if individual outcomes are contractible despite...
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作者：Di Lonardo, Livio; Sun, Jessica S.; Tyson, Scott A.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Emory University; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of autocracy in which repression helps quell acute threats, increasing an autocrat's survival probability or deterring challenges altogether, but at the expense of policies that reduce popular discontent and future opposition mobilization. Our main contribution is characterizing a unique stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, which takes one of three forms: deterrence, where the autocrat is never challenged; instability, where challenges occur every period; or a dete...
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作者：Lee, Eungik; Ngangoue, Kathleen; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We compare preferences for temporal resolution when uncertainty is resolved over a probability rather than a value. In various theoretical frameworks, preferences over gradual versus one-shot resolution do not depend on whether values or probabilities define the main object of uncertainty. In our experiment, however, we find that preferences for resolution vary with the type of prize: subjects prefer gradual resolution for uncertain value prizes, whereas no such preference emerges for uncertai...
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作者：Andrade, Rodrigo; Castro-Pires, Henrique; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：The World Bank; Harvard University
摘要：We analyze optimal procurement contracts when suppliers learn about project costs over time and retain an ex-post right to exit. In the first period, the firm observes a private signal on the likelihood of high costs; in the second, it learns the realized cost type and decides whether to continue or exercise its outside option. We show that when exit opportunities are sufficiently attractive, the optimal mechanism pools all first-period signals and reduces to a cost-plus contract, with payment...
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作者：Bo, Inacio; Chen, Li
作者单位：University of Macau; Tongji University; University of Gothenburg
摘要：We study the evolution of entry-level civil service job assignment in imperial China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures were sequential, irrevocable, and publicly verifiable, relying increasingly on lots-drawing and operating under constraints that limited which posts candidates could fill and where they could be posted. Using a unified matching framework, we compare procedures by their ability to maximize the number of filled posts and to assign higher-ranked jobs t...
