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作者：Koh, Youngwoo; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally study centralized college admissions in which colleges evaluate students under a 'translucent' admission system and students can learn each college's suitability through costly information acquisition. In centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, students decide whether to acquire information before submitting their rank-order lists. However, uncertainty about the final assignment lowers the expected gain from learning, there...
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作者：Sadakane, Hitoshi; Tam, Yin Chi
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study analyzes strategic interactions between cheap talk and lie detection, identifies the receiver-optimal equilibrium under costly lie detection, and evaluates its effectiveness. An informed sender seeks to persuade an uninformed receiver to choose higher actions, while the receiver aims to align the action as closely as possible with the true state. The sender issues a claim about the state, and the receiver then decides whether to incur a cost to inspect the claim's truthfulness. We s...
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作者：Anagnostides, Ioannis; Kalogiannis, Fivos; Panageas, Ioannis; Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios; Mcaleer, Stephen
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory, such as congestion games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team-in the absence of explicit communication-is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications. Sinc...
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作者：Ribeiro, Mauricio
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：Economists often rely on people's choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group's choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of ...
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作者：Clyde, Alexander
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：When using data, an analyst often only has access to proxies of the true variables. I propose a framework that models decision makers who naively assume potentially noisy proxy variables are perfect measurements. Due to feedback from choices into data, a notion of equilibrium is required to close the model. I illustrate the concept with applications to policing/crime and market entry. In these applications, we see that very small imperfections in the proxy variable can lead to large distortion...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper examines bargaining between a seller and a buyer with a binary private valuation. The seller offers a price to the buyer in each period. We explicitly construct the complete equilibrium set via an induction argument both for the finite and infinite horizon cases. When the horizon is finite and the probability of a high buyer valuation is large, the seller consistently charges a high price, resulting in trade bursts at the outset and deadline, with constant trade rates in between. We...
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作者：Kamphorst, Jurjen; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This paper studies public concern grounds for high prices of drugs treating rare and debilitating diseases. We offer a theory that explains how drug indivisibility, individual budget constraints, and insurance interact to drive up drug prices, especially for drugs treating rare and severe diseases. For a broad range of drug production costs and income distributions, our model predicts that drug prices are either set at their highest levels covered by insurance or inversely related to the preva...
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作者：Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Lund University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price equilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or ...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Luo, Donglai; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We examine a unique auction format used in the Istanbul flower market, which could transform into either Dutch or English auction depending on bidders' bidding behaviors. By introducing a time cost that reduces the value of a perishable good as time passes, we explore how this hybrid auction format accommodates the desire for speed via an adaptive starting price. We show that the Istanbul Flower Auction outperforms both the Dutch and English auctions in terms of the auctioneer's utility. With ...
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作者：Ma, Zizhen; Riquelme, Nicolas
作者单位：Wuhan University; Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the competitive distribution of auctions (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller's possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.
