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作者：Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We propose a new dominance notion in strategic games-weak* dominance-that reflects the idea of cautious* rationality, whereby a rational player believes that each opponent's individual actions are played with positive probabilities. In this paper, we show that an action is weakly* dominated if, and only if, it is not a best response to any marginally full-support conjecture. We characterize Gul's (1996) notion of perfect z-rationalizability through an iterative procedure (S infinity W*): remov...
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作者：Acharya, Subas; Jimenez-Gomez, David; Rachinskii, Dmitrii; Rivera, Alejandro
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Morgan Stanley; University of Barcelona; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic wealth management model for risk-averse agents displaying present-bias in the form of hyperbolic discounting. The agent chooses optimal consumption and labor supply policies and allocates her funds between a risk-free asset, a traded liquid asset, and a non-traded illiquid asset. We characterize these policies for both sophisticated and naive present-biased agents. There are three results. First, sophisticated agents overconsume more and supply less labor than the...
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作者：Bahel, Eric; Trudeau, Christian; Wang, Haoyu
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Windsor
摘要：We introduce the notion of preconvexity, which extends the familiar concept of convexity found in cooperative games with transferable utility. In a convex game, the larger the group joined by an agent, the larger the marginal value brought to the group by that agent. By contrast, in strictly preconvex games, an agent's marginal contribution is initially decreasing (when joining small groups), and it eventually becomes increasing at (and above) some critical group size. As a consequence, the co...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined conditions which imply no trade, such as relaxing the common prior and common knowledge assumptions, as well as allowing for agents who are boundedly rational or ambiguity averse. We contribute to this literature by examining conditions on the private information o...
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作者：Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click- through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator o...
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作者：Barokas, Guy; Nitzan, Shmuel
作者单位：Ruppin Academic Center; Bar Ilan University
摘要：In his refined characterization of the Borda rule, Maskin (2025; forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy) significantly employs the assumption of a continuum of voters. He concludes by posing an important open question about the possible extension of the characterization result to the case of finitely many voters. This note provides a positive response to this question, based on a novel axiom that conveys the normative appeal of continuity when applied to a discrete setting, namely, th...
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作者：Osun, Elif B.; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretica...
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作者：Gorelkina, Olga; Laraki, Rida; Reynouard, Maxime
摘要：This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and applies it to the Verifier's Dilemma, a fundamental problem in the design of blockchain consensus. BARNE extends the Nash Equilibrium (NE) to accommodate interactions among Byzantine, altruistic, and rational agents, known as the BAR setting in the distributed computing literature. We prove the existence of BARNE in a broad class of games and introduce two refinements: global stability and local stability. We...
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作者：Zhou, Yihang
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：A developer seeks to persuade a sequence of two short-tenured officials to award her a contract. Officials maximize social welfare, and the second official follows a bureaucratic norm requiring reliance only on evidence presented directly to him. Thus, Bayesian inference is restricted when the first official defers the decision, because the second does not observe the first official's evidence. The first official can exploit this restriction to induce more informative experiments. When the sta...
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作者：Cheng, Yao; Wang, Dazhong; Yu, Jingsheng
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Nanjing University; Wuhan University
摘要：This paper studies a preference revelation game induced by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EDA) mechanism in a priority-based allocation problem. The main findings are: (i) we show the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under EDA through a simple algorithm; (ii) the equilibrium outcome from the algorithm coincides with the outcome of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism; and (iii) the strategy profile found by the algorithm is also a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the game in...
